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                             Political Economy of The Budgetary Process  in Malaysia. 
                                             
                                                                     Abstract 
 
The ruling political party or the ruling government has rights in drafting and implementing 
economic policies including the budget policy. In the case of Malaysia, as observed, the 
budget policy is associated with the long or medium term economic development plans that 
are drafted, current thinking or thought of economic policies and additional measures that 
would be introduced probably related to major economic events such as the impact of 
financial or global economic crises. Also the budget includes  economic policies according to 
the ruling party‟s manifesto and promises made during the election. Eventhough the budget is 
the ruling government‟s privilege but the  government‟s financial plan, i.e the allocation and 
the manner of spending, taxation and borrowing are subject to law, acts, rules and procedures. 
The ruling government cannot simply utilize economic resources for its political means or 
interests. This paper argues that there is a solid link between the ruling political party with the 
preparation of the budget policy. To examine the matter this paper uses the survey method. 
This paper has found that in the case of Malaysia the Member of Parliaments do influence the 
outlining of the annual budget.  
 
Keywords:  Political Institutions, Elections, Development Plans, Budget Policy, Malaysia 
 
                                                           Introduction 
 
Since independence in August 1957, the law makers and bureaucrats in Malaysia have greatly 
emphasized on the annual budget in order to achieve macroeconomic stability as well as to 
produce high and sustainable economic growth. The budget is a comprehensive economic 
plan because it involves not only government financial plans for the following year but it also 
incorporates the objectives or aims of medium or long-term economic development plans.  
However, there are provisions to some changes of policy or if there is an economic event 
such as economic crisis which needs immediate attention. These emergence of new policies 
in the budget are supposedly to enhance and strengthen future economic development. The 
economic policies that are drafted including budget and development plans are the ruling 
government‟s privilege.  
 
The issue of the relationship between political parties and the budgetary policy in Malaysia is 
actually large and critical.  In drafting the budget policy, elected Member of Parliament or 
policy-makers of the ruling government will offer ideas, suggestions or proposals to the 
executive council or the Cabinet. The budget is regarded as one of the political tools for the 
ruling party to remain in power and continue ruling the country.  The budgetary policy 
designed  every year by the ruling government is indirectly to gain further support or to 
strengthen the presence of their political party in the country. This is important so that they 
can be re-elected into office in the coming general election. Due to the limited economic 
resources it is not possible in any country that the yearly budget satisfies the demands of all 
quarters of the people. Therefore there would always be issues that surface and are voiced out 
by certain groups of people in terms of allocation and distribution of the public‟s money. 
Also there is a conflict of interest between the ruling government and the opposition which 
creates  political uneasiness and disintegration amongst political parties and the government.     
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                                     Politics and Process of the Budgetary Policy 
 
There are substantial amounts of studies that have been made in respect to the relationship 
between the budget policy and the bureaucrats including the policy makers. Goyal (2010) 
described the relationship as a mechanism of collective choices. A collection choice is a 
necessitate use of power by the ruling government (executive) and the state to resolve conflict 
of interest within economic matters. Eventhough there is a conflict of interest between the 
executives and the state, usually the executive manage to empower the state, the state will 
indirectly allow the executive to draft an economic plan to manipulate the country‟s 
economic resources for political agenda and interests. There could be some segments of the 
population or sectors which are left out or do not receive significant attention  from the 
government. The political process can use the resources best suited for its political goals, 
namely to move the state towards tax exemption to favour certain groups whilst using the 
audits to harass political opponents (Taliercio, 2004). We could say that the budget is an 
annual plan for the ruling government with desirous intention to achieve goals by exploiting 
the economic resources (Fjeldstad, and Tungodden, 2003) and they, i.e the politicians of the 
ruling government know better the objectives and target of the annual  budget than the people 
(Goyal, 2010). Wildavsky (1986) stated that the interaction between political institutions and 
budgetary policies and its success or failure depends on the political institution to recognize 
the objective of the budget. It is the responsibility of the ruling government and the state to 
execute or implement the budget in the country in a fair and equitable manner.  
 
There are empirical evidences which show the influence of political institution‟s  on the 
country‟s budgetary process. Poterba (1994) and, Poterba and Hagen (1999) drew the 
conclusion that in most countries political institutions do affect the budgetary process. They 
also described that the public budgeting process is associated to gubernatorial powers. 
Gubernatorial powers are the single most powerful players in the state government, i.e the 
strong political party in the government (Wildavsky, 1986 and Beyle, 1996). It substantially 
influences the budgetary process from the beginning to the end of the process, and the 
powerful player is willing to use its  veto power for budget approval in the parliament or at 
the lower house (Dobell and Ulrich, 2002:6-7).  Although the major player or major political 
party has a solid grip over tax revenue collection and management, however the political 
stake is high if there is maladministration or laxity in the use of the resources (Taliercio, 
2004). Lee Dong (2004:49) indicated that the mandated parliamentarian has to implement 
fiscal or other type of economic policies responsibly as it affects the livelihood of the people. 
In contrast, Kim (2004: 20) raised a statement that a weak government is the nation‟s serious 
constraint on the parliamentary role in the budgetary process. 
 
The program of budgeting is obviously related to  political party policies or motives, and not 
so much to partisan politics (Wildavsky, 1986). As mentioned by Wildavsky (1986), “the 
thrust of program budgeting makes it an integral part of system politics.”  The politics of the 
budgeting process is widely related to the political system of the ruling government 
(Wildavsky, 1986). A failed budgetary process is related to the failure of the political 
institution or politicians to draft a progressive budget (Adolph, Breuning and Koski, 2007).  
Wildavsky (1986) also stated that the budget policy is one of the social orders where moral 
norms regulate interactions between people and politicians.  Meerman (1979:20) suggested 
the state is an institution creating and enforcing rules in conjunction with other forces 
resulting in certain income and wealth distribution. He also argued that the capability or the 
lack of a government to govern income and expenditure are  influenced by their cultures. 
Simply, it means that the relationship between revenue and expenditure varies according to 
 4 
political thought (Cusack, 1999). Norton and Elson (2002) stated that the budget process 
should be closely linked to policy and planning processes; all of which should be under the 
effective direction of a legitimate and democratic government. Wildavsky (1986) argued that 
a politician invariably performs informal system analysis and then invents policies for the 
purpose of achieving his objectives by satisfying others or at least receiving maximum 
agreement from all sides. According to Wildavsky (1986: 468), “A budget…may be 
illustrated as a  series of goals with price tags attached. Since funds are bounded and have to 
be alienated in one way or another, the budget turns out to be an instrument for making 
choices among alternative outflows. While the choices are organized so as to reach the 
desired goals, a budget is possible to be addressed as a plan”. Therefore, the budget is an 
expenditure plan. The use of the revenues collected from taxes are restricted in accordance to 
rules and procedures; inevitably turning into a mechanism in making choices within the 
optional expenditures.  
 
In general, the government‟s economic policies can be defined as a measure to stimulate 
economic growth and development. Another possible definition of economic policies is the 
action taken by the government to influence economic performance. The various types of 
economic actions usually implemented by the government are the adjustment of national 
expenditure, taxation, as well as setting private property rights and interest rates via the 
central bank actions.  The progress of economic development depends on what extent the 
government executes drafted economic policies effectively and efficiently. The budget is 
actually the plan on how the ruling party manage to utilize  economic resources. The main 
resources are the tax revenues. The government expenditures depend on the amount of tax 
revenues collected. Therefore, the taxation policy is a crucial element in the government‟s 
budgeting. Thus, we could describe the budget as a policy of taxing,  the method of tax 
revenues collection, and the allocation of the revenues for government administration and 
economic development. There are three types of budget tools namely a balanced budget, 
deficit budget and surplus budget.  A balanced budget is defined as total expenditures equal 
to total revenues collected in that particular year.  However, if the expenditure is more than 
that of revenues received then the budget is a deficit budget whereas the budget is considered 
a surplus budget if the total revenue is much more than the expenditure.  The government 
deals with a deficit budget by raising funds via sales of bonds or by the issuance of the new 
currency or simply printing more money.   
 
The relationship between the political system and economic performance has been an 
attractive topic of research for political economists as well as political scientists. There have 
been studies on the influence of the majority and minority ruled governments on economic 
results such as studies by Alesina and Perroti (1995). There have also been studies on the 
influence of elections on the evolution of macroeconomic policies, i.e fiscal and monetary 
policies, such as by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997), and Grilli, Masciandaru and 
Tabellini (1991). It should be noted that the effectiveness of the lawmakers‟ roles in 
managing the economy  has no direct answer but it has a definite correlation with the 
majority of representations held by the ruling party in the parliament as in the case of 
Malaysia. As a majority in the Parliament, the ruling party has great influence on economic 
matters and the implementation of those economic  policies.  
 
The budgetary policy is one of the most important tools to political institutions or the ruling 
government to gain further support from people or to strenghten their political presence in the 
country. The national budgetary process is like a system where the aspirations of the 
electorates or voters are translated into programs such as building public goods and public 
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value in which the ruling government believes that it would satisfy the voters. In Malaysia the 
electorates cast their vote and select the politicians or representatives every five years through 
the general election. The election is not a mere vote because the elected person represents the 
people‟s  voice in the parliament or state legislature assembly which deliveres their concern 
on development at their respective constituencies.                        
         
 Malaysia: Political Institutions, Development Planning and Budgets. A Short Review 
 
In brief, Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy. The Yang Di Pertuan Agong (paramount 
Ruler or King) is the constitutional monarch who reigns but does not rule. The King is merely 
a ceremonial head of State. The core of the political system in Malaysia is linked to the 
system of Cabinet government. The cabinet is led by the Prime Minister (PM) and his 
members which are ministers  appointed by the PM “himself” or after consultations with 
members of his political party or political alliance. Members of the cabinet are the executives 
and  they are also members of parliament (MP) who are members of the Dewan Rakyat 
(House of Representatives, also known as the Lower House).   Members of parliament are 
elected through the general election which is held every 5 years.  In 2008 or under the 12
th
 
General Election, there were 222 constituencies offered in the country which means that there 
are 222 members elected to the Dewan Rakyat by the people. The number of electoral seats 
in the Parliament has increased from 109 in 1959 to 222 in 2008 as the result of delineation 
exercises carried out by Election Commission every ten years. The Barisan Nasional (BN) or 
the National Front (see Table 1) had secured substantial majority  since independence. 
However, in the last general election, the 12
th
 General Election held in 2008, the BN only 
obtained 58.57% popular votes. Since 2008 the Barisan Nasional, a coalition front of 13 
component parties,has been ruling the country with less than two-third majority. 
 
Since independence, Malaysia has undergone 12 General Elections. Malaysia has two 
electoral processes namely state and federal elections. Except for the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak, the other states in the federation of Malaysia have simultaneous elections for both 
the state and federal seats.  The East Malaysian states however have the state elections 
differed by two years. The political party or coalition with the majority shall form the 
Government which lasts for 5 years as stated in the Federal Constitution. Members of 
Parliament are elected to the Dewan Rakyat; whilst the state assemblymen are members of 
the state legislative assemblies.  The Prime Minister is elected indirectly after the General 
Election by the consensus made amongst the members in the ruling or winning government.   
 
The Cabinet of 2008 is comprised of 32 ministerial positions. There were 37 deputy of 
ministers but they are not in the Cabinet. The large size of the government is related to the 
number of political parties under the BN. To please members of the coalition, the Prime 
Minister increased the size of the Cabinet by creating new ministerial portfolios and 
increasing the number of deputies of minister. Relatively the size of Cabinet in Malaysia is 
larger than India and United Kingdom, as an example. One of the main reasons why Malaysia 
is stuck with a large budget deficit is partly due to the larger size of the government 
(Meerman,1979:18; Salleh and Osman, 1991:12). The increased number of members 
(ministers) in the Cabinet or size of the Cabinet is one of the reasons of the huge public sector 
expenditure. This has possibly  increased wastage of public expenditure and caused 
redundancy of ministerial duties and portfolios. This actually has impedes the delivery 
process, mismanages public money and creates inefficiency in the government 
administration. As argued by Roubini and Sachs (1989), a coalition government has an 
apparent trend to create larger deficits than a single-party government. This is so as the 
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coalition partners are beholden to their supporters. The relationship between politics and the 
budgeting process can be derived  on the manner of elections which creates an impact on the 
budgetary process.    
 
Through the general elections, the Barisan Nasional has controlled and the managed 
country‟s economic resources since 1957. We do not deny that under BN rule, Malaysia‟s 
economy has expanded quite impressively. Eventhough there were some distortions during 
the implementation of development planning and economic progress such as the racial riot in 
1969 and external shocks but the government managed to restore political stability and 
maintain economic momemtum.  The budgets that were tabled in the parliament by the 
Ministry of Finance during the pre-New Economic Policy (NEP) or in the post-NEP were in 
accordance with Malaysia Development Plans. Malaysia‟s development planning can be 
broken-up into five phases (Table 2). The phases are related to the medium term development 
planning, i.e the pre-New Economic Policy, the New Economic Policy, the New 
Development Policy, the New Vision Policy and the New Mission. Under the pre-NEP phase 
 
                                        [INSERT TABLE 1,2 AND 3] 
 
there were two development plans which were the First Malaya Plan (FMP), the Second 
Malaya Plan (SMP) and the First Malaysia Plan (FirstMP). The  FMP was drafted by the 
British government, i.e, before Malaysia gained independence in August 1957. Economic 
policies under the FMP were resumed by the new elected government. The main focus of the 
FMP was restructuring the production sector by promoting the manufacturing sector. The 
Pioneer Industries Ordinance was established in 1958 in line with the initiative of developing 
the manufacturing sector whereby the manufacturing strategy adopted was the import-
substitution policy (ISI). The economic diversification was crucial to Malaysia  in reducing 
the impact of the collapse of primary commodity prices on the economy. However, the FMP 
failed to promote significant economic development. One of the factors which caused the 
failure was that prices of primary commodities in the international commodity market in 
1958 dropped sharply, and consequently affected the performance and progress of Malaysia‟s 
economy. The dismal economic performance then resulted in the increase of poverty in the 
rural area by 70 percent whereas the unemployment shot up to nearly 8 percent.     
 
Under the Second Malaya Plan (SMP), 1961-65 and the First Malaysia Plan (First MP), 
1966-1970,  the economy had not seen much improvement as the impact from the 1958 
primary commodity collapse had prolonged into 1960s.  The ISI strategy had also failed to 
alleviate the growing labour surpluses in the economy.    The failure of the FMP, SMP as 
well as the FirstMP to improve the faltering economy and to reduce income imbalances had 
certainly indicated that the laissez faire approach or the role of the private sector for 
economic development which was the main guide for the government in implementing the 
development plans had actually failed.  The dismal economic performance during the period 
resulted in the racial riot on May 15, 1969 (Snoodgrass, 1980:60; Comber, 1983: 56-57).  
Based on the post mortem of the racial riot incidence, the federal government noticed that one 
of the main reasons that precipitated the bloody incidence was due to the unhappiness of the 
Malays because of the poor income distribution, ownership and control of wealth and lack of 
economic opportunities compared to other races. The Malays were generally poorer 
economically than the other races and had lagged behind in education; employment and other 
social and economic areas.  In order to address the ethnic and economic disparities the federal 
government embarked on a new development approach called  the New Economic Policy in 
1971. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was the blue-print for the first long-term Outline 
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Perspective Plan (FOPP). The FOPP constituted of the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), 
Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980), the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) and Fifth Malaysia  
Plan (1986-1990). The NEP was dratfed by the ruling political party led by the former prime 
Minister the late Tun Abdul Razak. The main idea of the policy was to reunite and rebuild the 
country. In general the NEP comprised of three major priorities as follows: (i) the promotion 
of national unity and integration; (ii) the creation of employment opportunities; and (iii) the 
promotion of overall economic growth
1
. The government channelled a huge amount of funds 
to fulfill and achieve the objectives of the NEP. Various governmental projects under the 
realm of different ministries, statutory bodies and government agencies were created to 
ensure the success of the NEP.  The objectives of the NEP were spelled out in the FOPP in 
the form of policies, programs and projects.  The first and foremost objective of the NEP was 
to generate employment opportunities in order to reduce unemployment.  The policy was to 
ensure employment in the various sectors of the economy that reflected the racial 
composition of the country.  In addition, the NEP aimed to expand opportunities for those 
engaged in low productivity activity to a more productive one.  Besides reducing income 
disparity amongst races the FOPP also aimed to modernize rural living besides improving the 
living condition of the urban poor.  The FOPP also aimed to expand education, training 
facilities and other social services of the country.   
 
                                                   [INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
Nevertheless, whilst certain quarters had hailed the implementation of the NEP to narrow the 
inequality between the Malays and the non-Malay; accusations were thrown at the federal 
government that the hidden agenda of the NEP was to substantially reduce the wealth of the 
non-Malays.  The NEP was implemented overtly through restructured race based business 
equity, preference on awarding low cost housing, preference for university places over the 
other races, and many other preferences.  Hence the NEP was often known as part of the 
Malay agenda. The implementation of the NEP and its extension has essentially given rise to 
many debates with the non Bumiputras expressing deep unhappiness towards the present 
government.  Since the NEP had failed to achieve its target,  the Barisan Nasional 
government resumed the NEP policy under the New Development Policy (NDP).  The NDP 
comprised of two development plans which were the Sixth and Seventh Malaysia Plans.  
 
The NDP maintained the basic strategies of the NEP with special emphasis on employment 
and rapid development of the Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC) to 
ensure Bumiputeras participation in the modern economic sectors.  The NDP was driven by 
the private sector with the objective of creating greater growth opportunities; also with the 
main thrust to focus on human resource development to ensure attainment of growth and 
distribution of wealth.  The Third Outline Perspective Plan (TOPP) launched in 2010 is based 
on the New Vision Policy (NVP).  The NVP incorporates the critical thrust of the previous 
development policy, principally to attain national unity.  Ultimately poverty eradication with 
the aim to restructure society and achieve balanced development irrespective of ethnic 
background is one of the main key strategies till 2010.  The NVP aims to achieve high 
sustainable economic growth by strengthening the financial and corporate sectors with an eye 
for macroeconomic management.  The NVP also strives to pursue environmental sustainable 
development while not forgetting the much needed human resource development to ensure a 
productive and competitive workforce to meet the liberalized global challenges.   
 
The massive government expenditure  (Table 3, 5 and 6) since implementation of the NEP 
had effectively reduced the unemployment rate. The Malay unemployment rate decreased 
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from 8.1 percent in 1970 to about 5.3 percent in 2005 while the Chinese unemployment rate 
dropped from 7.0 percent to 2.4 percent respectively (Table 4). The unemployment rate 
among Indians also dropped from 10.5 percent in 1970 to 3.1 percent in 2005. The pragmatic 
policy of FOPP, SOPP and TOPP reduced the incidence of poverty in the rural areas from the 
high of 69.3 percent in 1971 to 7.4 percent by 2008. The government also managed to reduce 
hardcore poverty of 35 percent in 1971 to 0.7 percent in 2008. Eventhough the development 
policies were able to reduce the poverty rate but the distribution gap of the income of the rich 
and the poor as well as rural and urban had increased. The Gini coefficients in 1970 of about 
0.502 decreased to  0.442 in 1990 but widened to 0.490 in 2008. The income gap ratio  
increased from 1:1.59 in 1970 to  1:1.70 in 1990 and  to 1: 2.11 in 2008. However, the 
income gap between races had dropped. The income ratio between Bumiputra and Chinese 
had decreased from 1:2.54 in 1970 to  1:1.74 in 1990 and  1: 1.64 in 2008.  The NEP and 
NDP had targeted a 30 percent share of the country‟s wealth for Bumiputras but in 2008 the 
wealth achieved was about 19 percent. 
 
                                           [INSERT TABLE 5, 6 AND 7]                                                       
 
The heavy intervention by the government in the economy since 1970 expanded the 
government size (or public sector) extensively (Table 5 and 6). In  1971-1975 the current 
expenditure of the federal government was about RM13.1 billion but in 2006-2010 the 
amount was RM561.5 billion. The increment was more than 4000 percent. The amount of 
development expenditure in the same periods were RM2.53 billion and RM268.2 billion 
respectively. The expenditure had increased more than 10,500 percent.  Eventhough the 
country faced severe economic depresion in the early 1980s, the federal expenditure 
continued increasing public spending for this period mainly to counter the impact of the 
economic recession.  From 1981-85 the budget deficits expanded quite largely of about 44 
percent of GDP but it declined to 28.3 percent in 1986-90. The decline in budget deficits 
were partly associated to the heavy inflow of foreign direct investment and the world 
economy started to stabilise during the period. The budget deficits further dropped in 1991-95 
and 1996-2000.  
 
The Asian financial crisis affected the Malaysian economy significantly in 1997/8. Recovery 
of the economy in 2001 and 2002 was affected due to the  collapse of NASDAQ stock at the 
New York Stock Exchange in late 2001. The NASDAQ drop eventually affected countries 
which relied on US market including Malaysia.  The US‟s financial crisis which struck in 
2007 and subsequently developed into a global economic crisis had also affected Malaysia‟s 
economic performance significantly. Since the market or international market confidence 
plummeted in 1998 to 1999, in 2001 to 2002 and since 2008, therefore the corporate 
investment hardly increased, moreover there were record that many local or foreign firms 
rationalised their operations by either downsizing their operations or by moving to other 
countries. The role of the private sector in improving the economy seems to have decreased 
since 1998. The competition for foreign direct investment and the declining export market 
have made Malaysia less attractive to foreign investors as we lose out to the Chinese 
economic strength and attractions.  This has affected the Malaysian economy in some ways 
(Table 7).  The only option for the government to reflate the economy and the market 
confidence is by implementing the budget deficits continously. As shown in Table 7 the 
budget has increased in 2001-05 and 2006-05.  
 
Since 1971 the Malaysian government used the budget polices quite substantially to respond 
to any impact from external shocks to the country‟s economy.  Indeed the federal government 
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or the ruling political party has provided macroeconomic stability by utilising effective 
economic measures available including the budget policy.  Based on record the budget policy 
has influenced economic growth  in 1971-1980, 1986-1996 and in 2005-2010. The 
unemployment rate has decreased from 1971 to 1985, then increased to 7.8 (increase due to 
economic depression) during 1986-1990 before declining sharply in 1996-2000. In 2009  the 
unemployment rate was about 4.5 percent. The trend of inflation rates were closely correlated 
with the economic performance.  
 
The government had been carefully managing public expenditure from 1991 onwards.  The 
budget deficits had been kept within a prudent limit with minimal use of borrowed funds. 
Since 1990 the government had reduce dependence on foreign funds for budget financing. 
Another factor that reduced the government‟s foreign borrowing was related to the 
privatization policy in which the government privatized substantial  infrastructure projects  
and selected non-financial public enterprises.  Since 1990 and before 1998 the government 
relied on the local financial market for budget financing such as borrowing from   the 
Employees‟ Provident Fund, national saving bank, insurance and other financial institutions.  
From 2000 to 2010 the budget deficits had increased primarily due to the impact from the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the global economic recession in 2007. The deficits in 
2000-2005 and 2006-2010 were about 23.2 percent percent and 19.0 percent of GDP 
respectively. The use of budget deficits measures to stimulate and promote economic growth 
had increased national debts considerably thereafter.  
 
 
                                         The Budgetary Process in Malaysia 
 
Each country has their own set of rules and procedures in the use of public money; therefore 
there may be a significant variation in the budgeting process across different countries. The 
legal system in the country also plays an important role in budgetary policies. In Malaysia, 
the budgetary policy is governed by the Federal Constitution in which the constitution has 
specifically spelled out a set of rules pertaining to financial provisions. Specific requirements 
concerning the control and management of public finance as well as the financial and 
accounting procedures are provided under the Financial Procedure Act 1957.  The procedures 
and practices of accounting and reporting are governed by a set of rules. Among the 
regulations governing the accounting procedures for the government are the Federal 
Constitution (Revised 1972), Financial Procedures Act, 1957 (Revised 1972) and Audit Act 
1957 (Revised 1972). These Acts provide limited and general provisions on financial, 
budgeting, accounting and auditing aspects of the government. Furthermore, the Treasury 
issues instructions and circulars on guidelines and requirements concerning accounting 
procedures. Malaysia‟s legal system does not stifle change as it has higher built-in flexibility. 
Eventhough there are rules and laws which govern the federal government‟s budget but the 
Executive or the Cabinet or  the ruling government has strong control over financial 
resources. The distribution of financial resources is indirectly, as we believe, skewed towards 
political objectives rather than the need or demand of the people regardless of race or 
political thought.  Therefore it is vital to see from the political standpoint if the content of the 
budgetary allocation is bias to certain groups and sectors that are closely linked to the ruling 
government interests.  In short, whether or not the budgeting process is closely associated 
with the political agenda of the ruling government or political party.   
 
The budget formulation motion includes the budget requests, budget examinations, budget 
recommendations, and budget approvals. Initially, the agencies from different sectors will 
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prepare their written suggestions for the coming year budget. By January of the year, “a call 
circular” is issued to all ministries and related agencies for the New Year Budget Estimates 
for the preparation of the coming year budget (Figure 1). The Ministry of Finance (MOF) or 
Treasury shall then receive the fiscal suggestions by March. It is then followed by a 
preliminary hearing by April of that year and later followed by the Budget hearing between 
May and July. Once the New Year Estimates are approved by the Ministry of Finance and the 
Cabinet; the budget reading shall be carried between the months of August to September. 
Upon agreement of the Cabinet, the budget document will be printed and tabled to the 
parliament in September. This budget document will then pass through the Lower House of 
Parliament from September to December for debates and approval. Members of Parliament 
are usually given a sufficient amount of time to debate on the spending proposals. Also, in 
certain circumstances they are given opportunities to amend necessary government priorities 
and intended spending plans; with full access to ministers and the bureaucrats for further 
details on the budget proposals.  After every subject matter arising on the budget has received 
approval from the Lower House and the Senate (Dewan Negara) thereafter, the Minister of 
Finance shall then proceed to issue a Warrant of the Expenditure for the various government 
agencies to execute the budget.   
 
                                                         [INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
The Executive or the Cabinet and the law makers of the Lower House of Parliament are the 
ultimate arbitrators of policy matters. The MOF is the main centre of drafting, implementing 
and executing the budget plan. Before the budget is formed, the MOF will seek input from 
various groups such as members of parliament of the ruling government, business 
associations, ministeries and non-govermental organizations (NGOs).  In general, every 
ministery has to prepare their budget plan and submit it to the MOF. Every year the Finance 
Minister, senior officers (civil servants) of the ministry and corporate leaders will convene a 
Budget Dialogue to discuss what possible policies should be introduced or to extend current 
policies in the coming year budget. Most of the opinions and recommendations are roughly 
from the corporate leaders (sector) however the MOF has an ultimate power in deciding 
whether suggested policies should be adopted or not.  
 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) likewise also holds annual dialogues 
with the private sector focusing on industrial policies. Other than these two activities, the 
various governmental ministries form committees and task forces to discuss with the private 
sector any matters related to the budget or any economic policies that  should be included in 
the coming year budget.  In doing so they also require input from various groups that are 
related to the ministries function. Input from the different ministries, government agencies 
and departments are submitted to the Cabinet for due consideration in the form of a Cabinet 
paper. The adoption of proposals or views are decided by the Cabinet; in the event that the 
Cabinet is unable to make a decision, then the ministry concerned may have to reevaluate the 
views before resubmitting to the Cabinet. Such a practice has been in place since 
Independence. Eventhough the different ministries and agencies are the major contributors of 
the policies, the government also requires input from NGOs to voice out their needs.  The 
non-political organizations involvement is important as political participation alone may not 
produce results in a workable  budget which should be equitable and non-discriminatory. The 
dynamic complex interaction shows how the power play of various groups either through a 
formal or informal channel influences the formation of a budget.  
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The national budget‟s success relies on what extent the budget create economic reactions 
among various economic agents and social sectors. The budget should be unbiased to various 
groups of people, races and corporate sector. There should be no skewness in the budget or 
favouring certain groups that are  closely linked to the ruling government. There should not 
be a heavy weight on the economic sector while other sectors such as welfare of the people 
get left out. This is to ensure that the budget can be ascertained with adequate resources 
available and the budget will guarantee that the economic and social welfare of the people 
will be maintained or enhanced.  Therefore,  the policy makers or MPs have to ensure that the 
budget plan drives economic growth development for the well-being of the people.  The 
budget is a comprehensive economic plan or an economic blue print and in drafting the plan  
a bargaining process is involved. Every ministery and government agency will bargain for  
public funds in the coming year. There will be politiking in drafting the budget plan. The 
politics of the budgeting process is essentially linked to the distribution of power within the 
process. During the budget formation and implementation process a disparate power 
relationship exists which gives rise to the exclusion or immediacy in the course of decision 
making.  
                                               Research Method: Survey  
 
The main intention of this paper is to study the relationship between political institutions 
(legislatures or law makers) and the budgetary policy. Specifically the main objective of this 
study is to examine the involvement or influence of the members of parliament (MPs) or 
legislature (non-executive) in the budgeting process including providing input to the MOF in 
the process of preparing the budget. To investigate the issue, this study has conducted a 
survey and the respondents are members of parliament or legislature. The time series data of 
the subject matter is impossible to obtain. Therefore the primary data is the only source that 
sheds light on the subject matter. It was not an easy task to conduct a survey and meet the 
MPs. Based on the pilot survey which was conducted during the second term of the 12
th
 
parliament session in November 2009 the response from the respondents were very poor.  
 
The survey consisted of 17 questions in which the questions were divided into four sections. 
The aim of the survey is to determine the behavior and responsibilities of the law-makers (or 
members of parliament) in the budgetary process. This study covers Members of Parliament 
(MPs) from the ruling government, Barisan Nasional, and the Opposition. A total of 164 
members of parliament (excluding front benchers) qualify for the survey. This study only 
covers MPs of the back benchers and opposition. Executives such as the Prime Minister, 
Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers, Deputies Minister and Political Secretaries or those in the 
Cabinet were not involved in this study.  Since it was hard to get cooperation from the MPs 
therefore we had to condense the sample size. From 164 MPs, only 30 of them were selected. 
18 of the 30 MPs were members of the ruling party, 10 from the opposition and 2 
independent members (Table 8). We selected 30 MPs based on our believes and judgement  
that they were more approachable for the survey and interviews. However, from the  sample 
size we only managed to collect 16 of the 30 questionnaires or equivalent to 56.7 percent of 
the total sample size.  The survey and interviews were conducted during the third term of the 
12
th
 Parliament Session in March 2010. The major constraints and short-coming of this study 
is the number of MPs who were willing to cooperate with us by filling up questions in the 
survey booklet. We are not sure about the reasons as to why 134 MPs were unwilling to 
cooperate with us on this study.  
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                                                  [INSERT TABLE 8] 
 
                                                     Results of Survey 
 
There are 17 questions in the survey. The questions are then categorized into four factors, 
namely  job as a member of parliament, reward for servicing constituency, social economic 
development, and opinion regarding the current political system and budgetary policy. 
 
Job as a Member of Parliament 
 
16 members of parliament (MPs) responded to the survey. All of them strongly agreed that 
their role in the parliament had contributed to the national economic development. 11 of 16 
respondents stated that they become MP‟s as it was their ambition and interest. 5 respondents 
reserved the question, i.e stayed neutral in answering the question (Table 9).   In respect to 
the question of giving a quick response to the demands of voters at their respective 
constituency, 8 MPs adopted a neutral stance; while another 7 MPs stated they were quick in 
responding to voters demand. Only one MP may be less favourable to provide a good 
response to his voters demand. On the question of freedom in executing decisions in  
fulfilling the voters demand, majority of the MPs seemed to have freedom to offer a quick 
response but they could not offer the decision exclusively. In other words, the MPs need to 
consult their superiors before delivering a response to their voters demand. Only 3 MPs seem 
to have their own freedom in delivering judgement or decision. These MPs are from the 
opposition. 
 
                                                    [INSERT TABLE 9] 
 
Reward for Serving Constituency 
 
Under the subject of reward of serving constituency there are three main questions posed to 
the respondents. The questions are, whether the MPs are satified with the salaries and 
allowances received from the federal government; is the federal government or ruling party 
providing adequate facilities including allocation for administration expenses and 
development for MPs duties; and the third is whether the ruling government offers an 
incentive or extra facilities to those MPs serving effectively and efficiently in their 
constituency respectively.  The survey shows only 5 respondents are satisfied with the 
salaries and allowances of MP (Table 10). (A note, the amount of basic salary and allowances 
include other fringe benefits that are received by MPs monthly but this survey is unable to 
provide it in this paper). Based on this survey we could say that the salary and allowances 
received by the MPs are not sufficient enough and do not commensurate with the jobs. The 
monetary reward seems to  play an important role in attracting people to join the political 
party and to become MP (or legislature at the state assembly). On the question of adequate 
facilities provided by the government for MPs servicing their respective constituency, 8 MPs 
disagreed that the government had provided adequate facilities for them to provide service at 
their constituency. Only 4 respondents agreed that the government had provided enough 
facilities for them to carry out their duties at their constituency. On the question of incentives, 
12 MPs agreed that the federal government or the ruling government offer or provide further 
incentives in terms of allocation or upgrading existing facilities or building new facilities if 
they service respective constituencies effectively and efficiently. Only two respondents did 
not agree that if they did the job effectively and efficiently they would receive further 
incentives.   
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                                                   [INSERT TABLE 10] 
 
MPs Involvement in the Budgetary Process and Focus on Social Economic Development  
 
Under this sub-heading, the involvement in the budgetary process by stressing on social 
economic development in drafting the budget, there are 5 questions imposed to the 
respondents. The first question is whether the MPs of the backbenchers are invited by the 
federal government, i.e Ministry of Finance, in helping prepare the budget in the form of 
providing ideas, suggestions, policies and other subjects related to the country‟s economic 
development. Only one person did not agree while 11 MPs agreed that the MOF invited them 
to provide suggestions or get involved in various committees that were established by the 
ministry for budget preparation (Table 11). On the question of whether the social economic 
agenda should be the main principle in drafting the budget, all MPs agreed that the federal 
government should underline a significant attention to socio-economic development. Based 
on the third question as stated in Table 11, it sees whether  the MPs are able to demand from 
the federal government to include matters related to people‟s welfare such as reducing the 
financial burden by reducing individual income tax, increasing tax rebates, reducing excise or 
sales taxes on consumer products, providing affordable houses or cheaper loans in providing 
houses to low and middle-income groups, offering affordable education costs particularly at 
the primary, secondary and first degree level. 
 
                                               [INSERT TABLE 11] 
 
The good MPs are those who are able to influence and demand the federal government or the 
ruling political party (government) in fulfilling their voters requests or demands. The main 
task of the MP is to serve the respective constituency effectively and efficiently regardless of 
race, religion and income group. If the particular MP does not do his job well then the 
constituency which he  or she represents would be left out in terms of economic progress and 
social development. Therefore this survey tries to explore the issue. The results of the 
questions will show implicitly if the elected person such as the legislator at the Lower House 
really looks after their constituency. In this survey the measurement of the matter, is 
subjective and not easily quantified as to what extent the legislatures are able to listen and 
forward their demands from the voters in their respective constituency at the Lower House. If 
the legislators are successful in demanding what his or her voters request, we assume that the 
legislator (MP) is doing his or her job well in servicing their constituency. The third question  
is on the ability and success  of the MPs in demanding from the government in fulfilling their 
voters requests. Only 8 MPs stated that they are able to influence the ruling government or 
MOF to meet the demand from voters of their respective constituency. 6 MPs stayed neutral 
and 2 MPs disagreed which means that they are unable to do their job well in servicing the 
people or their voters.  
 
One of the critical issues in formulating the budget is to what  extent the ruling government is 
really concerned about the welfare of the people or social economic development in the 
country. The question posed to the respondents, is whether the federal government (or 
Cabinet) puts great emphasis or includes the welfare of the people (rakyat) in the budget. 
Welfare is a subjective matter and difficult to be quantified. There are policies which may 
influence the welfare of people in the form of reducing costs of living (increasing people 
purchasing power) such as providing free education or reducing education fees of children, 
reducing medical bills, increasing development of public goods, providing affordable housing 
 14 
and reducing taxation rates such as income tax, excise duties, sales tax and services tax. 10 
MPs agreed that the federal or ruling government  is very much concerned about the people‟s 
welfare and highlighted the matter in the budget. To ensure that the government is actually 
emphasizing or thinking of the people‟s welfare in drafting the budget and to somehow cross-
examine, so the following question was posed to the respondents, what is the federal 
government‟s prime priority in drafting the budget that is whether focus is on private sector 
development or social economic development. 14 MPs stated that the yearly budget drafted 
and executed by the government are more concerned and focused on private sector 
development rather than social economic development. The results indicated that the social 
economic development seems to be a secondary matter to the ruling government.   
 
Political system and the budget policy 
 
The previous sub-section on political institution and the budget had briefly described the 
political or electoral system in the case of Malaysia. Related to this subject, this survey is 
very much interested to know from the respondents about the kind of political system which 
has existed in Malaysia since 1957 that has promoted good macroeconomic management and 
economic development through the budget policies. Should the current political system be 
maintained or transformed into another kind of political system to make or produce a good 
budgetary policy for the country. There are five questions constructed under this sub-section. 
Question 1 asks if the existing political system is effective in drafting and executing the 
budget plan. Only one MP did not agree and 11 MPs agreed that the current political system 
is effective in drafting and executing the budget (Table 12). In other words it means that the 
MPs agree that the current system should be preserved. Question 2 is whether the current 
structure of the budgetary formulation process is able to develop a good budget for the 
country, as depicted in Figure 1.  2 MPs did not agreed while 8 MPs agreed that the process 
should be maintained. Another issue which is quite relevant in respect to the budget is the 
timing and duration of the budgetary formulation process.  Since early 2000 the duration of 
the process of budget formulation has been shortened. This is due to the Minister of Finance 
who had changed the tabling of the budget at the Dewan Rakyat from the month of 
November to September. The duration for budget preparation has been cut from 11 months to 
9 months. We believe the rationale of the budget being tabled in September, is that members 
of the Dewan Rakyat would have enough time to debate the budget and the budget could be 
executed and implemented by late December of the year. All economic policies and 
disbursements of allocation will be implemented in December for the coming year. The 
execution and implementation of the budget will no longer begin in January of the new year, 
as practiced before year 2000. Based on the survey, 15 MPs agreed that the timing of budget 
formulation should be reviewed. The time frame or duration for preparing the budget should 
be longer i.e at least 10 months. The current process which takes about 9 months seems to be 
tiring some quarters or groups of people involved in the budget preparation including (some) 
MPs (backbencers) of the ruling government.  
 
As mentioned earlier in this paper the budget plan and policies are strongly influenced by the 
ruling government since the BN has a majority at the Dewan Rakyat. The following and the 
fourth question which was posed to the respondents is whether the ruling political party (the 
ruling government) substantially influences the national budget policy. All MPs agreed that 
the BN has solid power in drafting the national budget. Subsequently, the fifth question is 
whether the total seats of political parties (the ruling government and opposition) at the 
Dewan Rakyat determine the approval of the budget. Regarding this question, 5 MPs agreed 
and 6 did not agree. The results have two implications. Whether the Dewan Rakyat approves 
 15 
or not,  the ruling government (the Barisan Nasional), i.e the Cabinet will directly veto any 
disagreement. The BN is able to do that because they have gained more than two thirds 
majority in the parliament. All MPs of BN will support any decision by their “boss”. Since 
independence, all budgets that are tabled by the ruling government, BN, have gone through 
without any objection at the Dewan Rakyat.   
 
                                              [INSERT TABLE 12] 
 
One would notice that the lawmakers are fully aware of their role and responsibility with  
respect to national economic and social development.  Related to the budgetary formulation 
process, the majority of the Members of Parliament agreed that the federal government 
should review the period of budgetary formulation. Furthermore the time frame for MPs to 
debate the budget should be longer so that the budget will be more well planned and cover all 
economic and social sectors. As mentioned, currently MPs only have about 2 months to 
debate the budget and by December economic plans in the budget will be implemented for 
the new fiscal year. Members of Parliament agree that the ruling or federal government 
should provide better incentives and facilities for them to carry out their service effeciently 
and effectively at their respective constituencies.  In short, this survey concludes that the  
political institution in Malaysia, i.e the ruling political party, carries significant influence on 
the budgetary process.  
                                                         Conclusion 
 
The budgetary process varies from country to country. The variation depends on the political 
and economic environment, legislative and constitutional factors and capability of the ruling 
government.  There are countries with parliamentary systems that have inclusion of strong 
budgetary process committees in which it has the authority to make certain recommendations 
to alter the budget proposal if needed. The budget is an important tool to shape the way 
forward for the economy and welfare of the people. The budget is a reflection of the 
government‟s economic objectives and policies. It also includes the government‟s policies on 
investment, international trade and employment; thus making a huge impact on the national 
income.  The budgetary process is the single and most important political tool that the ruling 
government can use to check and counter the strength and advancement of the opposition 
parties. The budgetary policy is an important tool for the ruling government to gain support 
or further support from the people or electorates. The ruling political party (government)  has 
the power in drafting and implementing the budget. The power in drafting any economic and 
social policies is an advantage to any political party in the government or majority in the 
parlimentarian system. In Malaysia, the budget tabled by the ruling government is approved 
without any significant objection from the Lower House and the Senate House.     
 
Malaysian MPs are trying to forward people‟s needs or demands from their electrorates into 
the budget. Furthermore, the MPs from the ruling political party particularly try to integrate 
what has been offered or promised during the past general election. Eventhough promises 
which were made by the ruling political party, Barisan Nasional, before the general election 
are not offered in the budget, however since the BN has a high majority in the parliament, the 
budget will eventually be approved. MPs believe in their role and responsibility to the 
electorates and therefore the budget must reflect electorates‟ precedence because the main 
criteria of economic progression depends on the people‟s welfare.  Before the general 
election date the ruling government purposely increase public allocation to gain support from 
the people. The MPs of the opposition notice and know that the ruling political party use 
extraordinary allocation for the above mentioned purpose, unfortunately they are hopeless in 
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controlling the matter. Moreover they do not have any power in objecting the matter. Most of 
the legislatures approached were very much concerned about the formulation of the 
budgetary process particularly regarding subjects related to economic and social (welfare of 
people) policies that were offered in the budget. They were concerned and felt uneasiness 
towards some of the government policies because they wish to see their government really 
improve performance in terms of delivery and  contribute towards nation building rather than 
focusing on certain groups of people that are closely associated to the ruling political party. 
The MPs do not deny that the presence of economic development policies have contibuted to 
certain groups of people.  
 
Endnotes. 
1. This paper does have any  intention to discuss in depth the NEP and Malaysia Development Plans. The main 
focus of this paper is to examine the link between the ruling government (political party) and the budgetary 
policy (and process).  
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                                                              Table 1 
                                      General Elections 1959 – 2008  
Election Year National Front* Opposition Total Seats 
  Seats % of Vote Seats % of Vote  
1 1959
 
74 51.7 30 48.3 104 
2 1964
 
89 58.5 15 41.5 104 
3 1969 95 49.3 49 50.7 144 
4 1974 135 60.7 19 39.3 154 
5 1978 130 57.2 24 42.8 154 
6 1982 132 60.5 22 39.5 154 
7 1986 148 55.8 29 41.5 177 
8 1990 127 53.4 53 46.6 180 
9 1995 162 65.2 30 34.8 192 
10 1999 148 56.5 45 43.5 193 
11 2004 198 63.9 21 36.1 219 
12 2008 140 52.2 82 47.8 222 
Note: Number of seats won by BN in 2008 includes 3 MPs of the Opposition that were jumped to BN in 2009. 
 *Alliance Coalation between 1959 and 1964, in 1969 Alliance    and Sarawak United People‟s   Party for 1969 
joined Alliance Party; and since 1974 Alliance Party was renamed Barisan Nasional  or National Front. 
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                                                        Table 2 
                                       Malaysia Development Plans. 
Long-term Policy Period Five Year Plan 
Pre-New Economic Policy 1956-1970 
(15 years) 
1
st
 Malaya Plan 
2
nd
 Malaya Plan 
1
st
 Malaysia Plan 
New Economic Policy (NEP) 
(First Outline Perspective Plan) 
1971-1990 
(20 years) 
2
nd
 Malaysia Plan 
3
rd
 Malaysia Plan 
4
th
 Malaysia Plan 
5
th
 Malaysia Plan 
New Development Policy (NDP) 
(Second Outline Perspective Plan) 
1991-2000 
(10 years) 
6
th
 Malaysia Plan 
7
th
 Malaysia Plan 
New Vision Policy 
(Third Outline Perspective Plan) 
2001-2010 
(10 years) 
8
th
 Malaysia Plan 
9
th
 Malaysia Plan 
The National Mission 
(High-income economy) 
2011-2015 
(5 years) 
10
th
 Malaysia Plan 
Source:  Government of Malaysia, Malaysia Plans, various issues. 
 
                                                       Table 3 
      Malaysia Plans: Allocation for Development (RM‟billions) 
Malaysia Plans Allocation Actual Budget deficits  
2MP 1971-1975 7.25 9.90 -38.6 
3MP 1976-1980 18.56 27.81 -29.7 
4MP  1981-1985 42.83 78.65 -44.0 
5MP  1986-1990 74.00 61.85 -28.3 
6MP  1991-1995 104.00 117.66 -2.2 
7MP  1996-2000 162.50 103.56 -7.4 
8MP  2001-2005 170.00 n.a -23.2 
9MP  2006-2010 220.00 n.a -19.0 
10MP 2011-2015 230.00 n.a - 
Source:  Government of Malaysia, Malaysia Plans, various issues.  
               Ministry of Finance, Economic Reports, various issues. 
 
                                              Table 4 
                   Malaysia: Unemployment Trends  
 Malay Chinese Indian Others Total 
1967/1968 5.7 5.1 8.4 4.9 5.8 
1970 8.1 7.0 11.0 3.1 8.0 
1975 6.1 6.3 10.5 9.2 6.7 
1980 6.5 3.9 6.3 3.6 5.6 
1983 7.0 4.0 6.4 3.8 5.8 
1985 8.7 5.5 8.4 5.0 7.6 
1990 5.8 4.5 4.9 1.7 5.1 
1993 3.3 2.5 2.7 2.3 3.0 
1995 4.6 1.5 2.6 0.4 3.1 
2000 4.6 1.6 2.7 2.1 3.4 
2003 4.9 1.9 3.0 2.4 3.8 
2005 5.3 2.4 3.1 4.1 4.2 
Source:  Malaysia Development Plan, various issues. 
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                                                          Table 5 
                Federal Government: Current Expenditure (RM‟billions) 
Period Economic Social Security General 
Admin. 
Other Total 
1971-75 0.381 2.49 1.80 0.75 1.64 13.06 
1976-80 2.38 13.25 8.43 3.75 10.40 38.21 
1981-85 7.57 22.67 15.52 7.33 28.91 82.00 
1986-90 9.05 30.43 17.34 11.97 40.70 109.49 
1991-95 15.02 51.67 25.50 19.38 52.66 164.23 
1996-00 23.35 80.33 32.19 30.62 69.87 236.36 
2001-05 33.30 141.90 53.02 45.90 122.62 396.74 
2006-10 50.94 194.80 85.44 44.69 185.58 561.45 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Reports, various issues. 
 
                                                            Table 6 
                   Federal Government:  Development Expenditure (RM‟billions) 
Period Economic Social Security General 
Admin. 
Other Total 
1971-75 1.82 0.01 0.42 0.12 0.16 2.53 
1976-80 12.51 0.36 3.33 0.62 1.22 18.04 
1981-85 25.03 1.33 7.26 0.82 2.91 37.35 
1986-90 21.70 1.42 2.98 1.01 0.87 27.98 
1991-95 26.01 3.01 11.89 2.44 0.18 43.53 
1996-00 44.18 15.50 11.59 13.50 0.85 85.62 
2001-05 64.26 69.00 22.59 12.78 1.50 170.13 
2006-10 88.04 56.10 20.48 102.00 1.61 268.23 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Reports, various issues. 
 
 
                                                             Table 7 
                                  Malaysia: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 
Period Accummulated 
Budget Deficit 
to GDP (%) 
Average Real 
GDP Growth 
(%) 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Inflation 
Rate (%) 
Average 
M2/GDP 
(%) 
1971-75 -38.6 7.1 6.6 2.9 59.4 
1976-80 -29.7 8.6 6.2 2.4 60.2 
1981-85 -44.0 5.1 5.9 3.1 65.1 
1986-90 -28.3 6.7 7.5 1.4 72.6 
1991-95 -2.2 8.7 3.9 3.5 80.0 
1996-00 -7.4 5.0 2.9 3.2 103.0 
2001-05 -23.2 4.8 3.5 5.2 108.0 
2006-10 -19.0 5.4 3.6 3.7 124.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Reports, various issues. 
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                                                                     Table 8 
                                  Members of Parliament in 2010 and Samples 
 Front Bench* Back Bench**/MPs Back Bench**/MPs 
(sample size) 
Ruling Party/Coalition 58 79                18 
Opposition parties - 82 10 
Independent  - 3 2 
Total 58 164 30 
Note: * Front Bench comprises of Ministers and Deputy Ministers. They are main members or core persons 
of the ruling political party and the main members are involved in making decisions for the  the country.  
**Back Bench are Members of Parliaments. The members of Back Bench from the Ruling Government have 
been known as the Barisan Nasional Backbenchers Council (BNBBC) since 2009. Previously it was called 
Barisan Nasional Backbenchers Club.. 
 
                                                           Table 9 
                                          Role as a Member of Parliament 
 
Table 10 
Rewards: Monetary and incentives that are given or received in return for servicing  
constituency 
 
Job: As a Member of Parliament 
(The Task and responsibility of MP) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Contribution to the national 
economic development.  
    16 
2. Ambition/interest as an MP    5 3 8 
3. Quick response to the demands 
from voters at the respective 
constituency. 
 1 8 6 1 
4. Related to „3‟, is there any 
freedom to execute decision or to 
fulfill the voters demand 
1 6 6 2 1 
Factor 2:  Rewards 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. Satisfied with the salary and  
allowances given. 
2 7 2 3 2 
2. The government is providing 
adequate facilities in carrying out 
duties at respective constituency 
regardless of political thought.  
 8 4 2 2 
3. Incentive and facilities received  
correspond to the effectiveness 
and efficiency  of MP servicing at 
respective constituency. 
 2 2 4 8 
 21 
                                                                     Table 11 
                                              Involvement in the budgetary process 
 
       
                                                               Table 12 
                      Political System and Drafting and Implementing Budget Policy 
 
Factor 3. Involvement in the 
budgetary process 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. MPs (backbenchers) are invited 
(directly or indirectly) in drafting 
the budget  
 1 4 5 6 
2. Social economic agenda should 
be the main principle in drafting 
the budget. 
   4 12 
3. The ability and succes of MPs in 
demanding people‟s welfare  to 
be included in the budget. 
 2 6 8  
4. Does the federal government (the 
Cabinet)  underline and stress the 
welfare of the people in the 
budget. 
 5 1 5 5 
5. Federal government‟s priority in 
drafting the budget  to private 
sector development rather than 
socio-economic  development. 
  2 4 10 
Factor 4: Opinion on political 
system in budget policy 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. The existing political system is 
effective in drafting and 
executing the budget plan. 
 1 4 5 6 
2. The current structure of the 
budgetary formulation process is 
able to develop a good budget 
for the country. 
1 1 6 6 2 
3. The schedule or timing of 
budgetary formulation process 
needs to be reviewed. 
  1 5 10 
4. The ruling political party (the 
ruling government) influences 
the national budget policy. 
   3 13 
5. The total seats of political parties 
(the ruling government and 
opposition) at the Lower House 
of Parliament determine approval 
of the budget. 
2 6 3 1 4 
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                                                               Figure 1 
                                  Malaysia: Flow Chart of Budget Formulation Process 
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Agencies Prepare 
and Submit New 
Year Estimates 
 
JANUARY 
Call Circular for New Year 
Estimates 
 
END OF DECEMBER 
Minister of Finance Issues 
Warrant for Expenditure 
 
SEPTEMBER 
Budget Document Printed and 
Submitted to Parliament 
 
SEPT-DECEMBER 
Parliament Debates and 
Approves New Year Budget 
 
 
Budget Execution by 
Agencies 
 
MARCH 
Receive Submissions and BRO 
makes individual Study 
 
 
APRIL 
Preliminary Hearing 
 
 
MAY - JULY 
Budget - Hearing 
AUGUST - SEPTEMBER 
Approval of New Year 
Estimates by the Ministry of 
Finance and Cabinet 
